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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a tribute to the power of persuasive public relations that
certain terms can become so laden with emotion that they are able
to trigger support of, or opposition to, a particular concept. It has
been noted, for example, that "[t]he term 'national emergency dispute'
seems to stimulate lurid fantasies in the minds of otherwise sober and
* Deputy Executive Secretary and General Counsel, National Education Associa-
tion. B.A., Brooklyn College, 1956; LL.B., Yale University, 1959; M.A., Columbia Uni-
versity, 1961.
*0 Staff Counsel, National Education Association. B.A., University of California at
Davis, 1969, J.D., 1972.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent institutional positions of the National Education Association.
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conservative citizens."' The term "preemption" has similar properties,
and in the current flap over the impact that a federal collective
bargaining statute for public employees2 would have on state statutes
affecting such employees, we see a classic example of the "lurid
fantasies" reaction. Thus, Dr. Myron Lieberman, of Baruch College,
City University of New York, and a consultant for the American
Association of School Administrators, states that if the preemption
doctrine that has developed in the private sector is applied to the
public sector, it "may create widespread confusion and uncertainty;
jeopardize important management rights and employee benefits;
threaten the stability and viability of retirement funds; and lead to
widespread and costly litigation. ' '3 Apparently assuming that such
transplantation would be the inexorable result if Congress remained
silent on the point, he concludes that "leaving this issue unresolved
in federal legislation would, in our judgment, be unwise, if not po-
tentially disastrous for state and local public employment relations."4
Spokesmen for other employer groups likewise have seized upon
the term "preemption" in an effort to evoke the desired opposition to a
federal collective bargaining statute for public employees. John Han-
son, President of the National Public Employer Labor Relations As-
sociation, an organization that represents state and local governments
in labor relations, referred to the matter in a letter to Senator Harri-
son Williams, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor. After
first noting that his organization was "opposed to the enactment of
federal legislation covering public sector collective bargaining at the
state and local levels," 5 Mr. Hanson continued:
The impact of federal legislation is difficult to ascertain. Involved
in the process are the state constitution, home rule charters, state
civil service laws, tenure laws, and the like .... These kinds of issues
do not exist in the private sector and their consideration and resolu-
tion must precede federal legislation, if it is to contribute to effec-
tive government at all levels.6
The foregoing comments are not meant to suggest that we consider
1. Aaron, The Bugaboo of Sovereignty and National Emergency Disputes, in IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY 75
(1955).
2. As used in this article, the phrase "public employees" refers to employees of
state and local governments and does not include employees of the federal govern-
ment.
3. Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 593, at B-4 (Feb. 17, 1975).
4. Id.
5. Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 580, at B-I (Nov. 11, 1974).
6. Id. at B-2.
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the matter of preemption an unimportant one. On the contrary, it
is of extreme importance and warrants the attention of anyone who
seriously is concerned with the effective operation of a federal collec-
tive bargaining statute for public employees. There is in all states
extensive statutory regulation of the terms and conditions of public
employment 7 and more than 30 states have enacted statutes which
provide for at least some type of collective bargaining between public
employers and their employees.8 Should Congress expressly indicate
the relationship between these statutes and a federal collective bar-
gaining statute or should it leave the matter to judicial determination
on a case-by-case basis? If the former course is followed, what options
are available to Congress and what factors should it consider in making
its choice? If Congress chooses the latter course, what is likely to be
the fate of the state statutes and, more specifically, to what extent can
we use the application of the preemption doctrine in the area of private
sector labor relations as a basis for prediction? This article considers
these and related preemption problems that must be confronted in
connection with a federal collective bargaining statute for public
employees, and attempts to provide an appropriate framework for
developing responsible answers to them.
II. THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL STATUTE
In order to discuss meaningfully the application of the preemption
doctrine to public sector collective bargaining, it is essential to make
certain assumptions as to the type of legislative action that Congress
is likely to take. Two principal approaches are presently under
consideration.
One approach calls for a separate statute to regulate collective bar-
gaining in the public sector. The statute would, in broad outline, es-
tablish an administrative structure analogous but not identical to
that established by the National Labor Relations Act9 (NLRA) for the
private sector. In the 93d Congress, this approach was reflected in
H.R. 8677, introduced by Representatives Clay and Perkins, and in
7. For a compendium of some of the state statutory provisions establishing terms
and conditions of employment for teachers, see LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW, A STUDY OF STATE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION (1974).
8. See DIVISION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT SER-
VICES ADMINISRRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE POLICY REGULATIONS FOR
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS (1974).
It should be pointed out that the collective bargaining rights of public employees
are sometimes dealt with in a state constitution. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.J.
CONsT. art. I, 19.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
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S. 3294, introduced by Senator Williams. Counterpart proposals have
not as yet been introduced in the 94th Congress.
The second approach would be to bring public employees under
the coverage of the NLRA. Two proposals which were introduced in
the 93d Congress-H.R. 9730 by Representative Thompson and S.
3295 by Senator Williams-would have achieved this result simply
by deleting the exemption for "any state or political subdivision
thereof" which is contained in section 2, paragraph 2, of the NLRA.
Representative Thompson has reintroduced his proposal in the 94th
Congress as H.R. 77. Others, while supporting the general concept
of NLRA coverage for public employees, believe that the foregoing
proposals represent an oversimplified approach. They contend that
the NLRA must be amended in several other respects in order
properly to accommodate differences between the private and public
sectors (e.g., the status of supervisors; impasse resolution machinery),
but no proposal along these lines has been introduced.10
Although, at appropriate points infra, we draw certain distinctions
between the separate statute and the NLRA amendment approaches,
their pertinent common feature is that they both would establish a
comprehensive federal system for regulating the relationship between
public employers and their employees. This system would, among
other things, obligate the parties to engage in collective bargaining
regarding "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment"'" or some equivalent generic phrase.
III. THE BASIS OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of federal -preemption derives from the interaction
of several provisions of the United States Constitution. The tenth
10. Although the above two approaches are receiving the greatest attention, in the
interest'of completeness reference also should be made to what is commonly referred
to- as a "minimum standards" approach. This approach envisions a federal statute
which would set -forth certain specified rights and obligations (e.g., the right of em-
ployees to form, join, and participate in the employee organization of their choice;
the right of the organization selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit to represent all such employees in bargaining with the em-
ployer), but would, at least in the first instance, leave it to the states to pass the
necessary implementing legislation. We assume that if a state failed to enact such
implementing legislation, the employees would come under the coverage of a backup
federal scheme. No proposal embodying this approach has been submitted to Congress
and, in the absence of a more complete elaboration of the specifics, it is not possible
to discuss its potential preemptive effect. Moreover, the "minimum standards" approach
has, to date, received limited political support.
Accordingly, we shall assume for purposes of this article that if Congress does
provide collective bargaining rights for public employees, it will do so by means of one
of the two approaches discussed in the text.
11. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Thus, the initial
question in any debate regarding preemption is whether congressional
action can be traced to a power "delegated to the United States by
the Constitution." If it can, the tenth amendments, by definition, be-
comes inapplicable. The task is then to determine the relative status
to be accorded to a federal statute and a state constitution, statute, or
other enactment 12 dealing with the same subject matter. This status
is governed by article VI, clause 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The constitutional authority for Congress to enact a public sector
collective bargaining statute would derive from the commerce clause,
which grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States.' ' 13 Principal support for this proposition is provided
by Maryland v. Wirtz,1 in which the Supreme Court upheld the 1966
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act 15 (FLSA) that extended
FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions to certain employees
of schools and hospitals operated by the states or their political sub-
divisions. In upholding the amendments, the Court pointed out that
"labor conditions in schools and hospitals can affect commerce;''16
that Congress had " 'interfered with' " the states' performance of
medical and educational functions "only to the extent of providing
that when a State employs people in performing such functions it is
subject to the same restrictions as a wide range of other employers
whose activities affect commerce, including privately operated schools
and hospitals;"' 7 and that "valid general regulations of commerce do
not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is involved."'1 ,
12. Unless otherwise indicated, we shall, for purposes of simplicity in discussion,
use the phrase "state statute" to refer to all types of enactments by a state or any of
its political subdivisions.
13. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
16. 392 U.S. at 194.
17. Id. at 193-94.
18. id. at 196-97.
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The Court concluded by noting that "it will not carve up the commerce
power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on com-
merce from private businesses, simply because those enterprises happen
to be run by the States for the benefit of their citizens."'"
On two subsequent occasions, the federal government has injected
itself into the public employee-employer relationship at the state and
local levels: (1) the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197220
extended the provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to
state and local government employees; and (2) on August 15, 1971,
pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,21 President Nixon
issued Executive Order No. 1161522 providing for the stabilization of
prices, rents, wages, and salaries. The Executive Order impaired
hundreds of thousands of individual employment contracts, modified
innumerable governmental budgets, and overrode many collective
bargaining agreements. These enactments have not thus far been
found wanting on constitutional grounds.2 3
IV. THE PRIVATE SECTOR PRECEDENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Preemption is a primary concern whenever the federal govern-
ment enters an area which previously has been left to state regulation.
A threshold question for Congress in each such instance is whether
to address the matter expressly or to leave it to judicial determination
on a case-by-case basis. Congress has not been of one mind in this
regard and the various federal labor statutes reflect different ap-
proaches. Thus, Congress chose the first option in the FLSA:
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall
excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal
ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum
19. Id. at 198-99 (footnote omitted).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. III, 1973).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1970).
22. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (1971); 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2575.
23. See Oakland Raiders v. Office of Emergency Preparedness, 380 F. Supp. 187
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Amalgamated Meat Cutters &c Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337
F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971); University of S. Cal. v. Cost of Living Council, 472 F.2d
1065 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
There are, however, several cases presently before the Supreme Court which involve
the reach of the commerce clause vis-a-vis the tenth amendment: United States v. Ohio,
487 F.2d 936 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973), cert. granted sub nor. Fry v. United States,
415 U.S. 912 (1974), challenging the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970; National League of Cities v. Brennan, prob. juris. noted, 95 S. Ct. 823 (1975)
(No. 74-878), and California v. Brennan, prob. juris. noted, 95 S. Ct. 823 (1975) (No.
74-879), both challenging the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the FLSA.
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wage established under this chapter or a maximum workweek lower
than the maximum workweek established under this chapter, and no
provision of this chapter relating to the employment of child labor
shall justify noncompliance with any Federal or State law or munici-
pal ordinance establishing a higher standard than the standard
established under this chapter .... 24
The NLRA reflects a contrary judgment. Except for the section
14(b) reference to state statutes prohibiting union security arrange-
ments, Congress did not expressly indicate its intention as to preemp-
tion, and "[t]he statutory implications concerning what has been taken
from the States and what has been left to them [by the NLRA] are
of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process
of litigating elucidation." 25
Although there are many factors which Congress might consider
relevant in deciding whether or not to set forth expressly the preemp-
tive effect of a federal collective bargaining statute for public em-
ployees, its relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the consequences
of congressional silence would surely be of major importance. Since
the courts undoubtedly would construe such silence as a tacit endorse-
ment of the prevailing doctrine of preemption, we may use the posi-
tions which have been taken in regard to the NLRA, and the counter-
part Railway Labor Act2 6 (RLA), as a basis for projection. In turn,
we may use this projection as at least a partial basis for determining
whether or not Congress should expressly address the preemption issue.
For purposes of analysis, the state statutes that might be subject
to preemption by a federal collective bargaining statute for public
employees can be divided into three categories. In the first category
would be those state statutes, regardless of their subject matter, which
are in conflict with an explicit provision of the federal statute. In the
second category would be those state statutes which may or may not
be in conflict with an explicit provision of the federal statute but
which relate specifically to the collective bargaining process and at-
tempt to regulate one or more of its aspects. The third category would
include those state statutes which do not have either of the foregoing
characteristics, but which establish specific terms and conditions of
public employment which would come within the mandatory scope
of collective bargaining under the federal statute. The potential im-
pact of a federal collective bargaining statute on the state statutes in
each of these categories is considered below.
24. Fair Labor Standards Act § 18(a), 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
25. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
26. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
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A. State Statutes in Conflict with the Federal Statute
This aspect of the problem may be disposed of summarily. The
federal statute clearly would prevail in regard to any matter which
was addressed expressly by Congress. Thus, for example, the state-
ment in section 5(b) (2) of H.R. 8677 that employee organizations
shall have "the right to have deducted from the salary of employees...
an amount equal to the fees and dues required for membership"
would render invalid any state statute which prohibited or otherwise
limited the right to dues deduction. The operative legal principle was
phrased as follows by the Supreme Court in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul:
A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and
requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical im-
possibility .... 27
B. State Collective Bargaining Statutes
The legal principle that would be pertinent to the statutes in this
category was succinctly summarized by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota:
[A]bsent inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation
it must be determined whether Congress manifested an intent to
displace coincident state regulation in a given area. Where Congress
has unequivocally and expressly declared that the authority con-
ferred by it shall be exclusive, then there is no doubt but that states
cannot exert concomitant or supplementary regulatory authority
over the identical activity.28
Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has held that
in the private sector questions concerning organizational rights, em-
ployee representation, the resolution of collective bargaining disputes
(at least in the absence of violence), and the like must be resolved
pursuant to the federal statute even though the state statute may be
supplementary rather than contradictory. It may be helpful to an
understanding of this latter point to provide a specific illustration.
Several of the current state public sector collective bargaining
statutes include supervisors within the definition of "employee" and
accord to them various rights and benefits. 29 If we assume that the
27. 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (emphasis added).
28. 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (1971) (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch, 150E, § 1 (Supp. 1975); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.202 (1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.72.020 (1970).
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federal collective bargaining statute adopts the NLRA position re-
garding supervisors-i.e., that they are part of management and en-
titled to none of the statutory rights and benefits accorded to rank-and-
file workers-could a state continue to accord these rights and benefits
to them? To the extent we are to judge by analogy to the private sector,
the answer is no. In Beasley v. Food Fair"° the Supreme Court held
invalid as contrary to the NLRA a North Carolina statute which
required employers to treat supervisors as 'employees."
In sum, the courts have held that Congress intended to assume
exclusive jurisdiction over any activity arguably protected or pro-
hibited by the NLRA, and state regulation is permitted only in regard
to those activities which are of "peripheral concern" to the federal
policy or which involve interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility."'" There is no reason to anticipate a different judicial
posture in the public sector, and we may conclude that, unless Congress
provides otherwise, a federal collective bargaining statute for public
employees would take precedence over any state collective bargaining
statute.
2
C. State Statutes Establishing Terms and Conditions of
Public Employment
Since a federal statute presumably would not mandate the con-
tent of collective bargaining agreements, the state statutes in this
category would not present a situation in which dual compliance
was a "physical impossibility."13 Moreover, since these statutes do not
specifically relate to collective bargaining, one would be hard pressed
to conclude that Congress had "unequivocally and expressly" mani-
fested an intention to preempt them.3 4
Their vulnerability derives instead from the third test that the
courts have fashioned: to wit, a state statute is subject to preemption
if it interferes with the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives
of Congress in enacting the federal statute.3 5 More specifically, the
30. 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
31. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959). See
generally Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
32. The state statutes would not be per se nullified. They would remain operative
-as do the various state statutes regarding private sector collective bargaining-in
situations in which the prerequisites for federal jurisdiction were not present or in
which, for other reasons, federal jurisdiction was not invoked.
33. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
34. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
35. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389
U.S. 235 (1967); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372
U.S. 714 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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state statutes in this category establish terms and conditions of public
employment which arguably would be mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining under the federal statute. The decisive question is
whether they therefore constitute an impermissible "frustration of
the national policy objective of unfettered collective bargaining.""
The Supreme Court has, on two occasions, considered the effect
of a state statute on the freedom of the parties to bargain collectively
pursuant to federal law. The first case, California v. Taylor,7 arose
when California contended that the Belt Railroad, which was owned
and operated by the state, could not constitutionally be held subject
to the RLA. The Court rejected this contention 38 and then proceeded
to touch upon two aspects of the preemption question. First, it noted
that a California statute which prohibited collective bargaining by
public employees was subservient to the RLA3 9 the obvious conclu-
sion under Garner v. Teamsters Local 776.4 0 The Court then con-
tinued in dicta as follows:
Under the Railway Labor Act, not only would the employees of
the Belt Railroad have a federally protected right to bargain col-
lectively with their employer, but the terms of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement that they have negotiated with the Belt Railroad
would take precedence over conflicting provisions of the state civil
service laws.41
This dicta in the Taylor case formed the basis for the Supreme
Court's holding two years later in Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver.4
2
The latter case arose when an Ohio court held invalid a provision
in a collective bargaining agreement that had been entered into
pursuant to the NLRA on the ground that it was in violation of
the state's antitrust law. The provision in question provided that
when the employer rented trucks from their owners, the owner-drivers
had to be paid the wages provided in the employer's agreement with
the union in addition to a certain minimum rental for the truck.
The provision's purpose was to prevent the undercutting of wages by
the owner-drivers who were outside of the bargaining unit. After
first holding that the minimum rental provision was a mandatory
36. ITT Lamp Div. of ITT Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 992 (lst Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
37. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
38. Id. at 568. Cf. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
39. 353 U.S. at 559-67.
40. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
41. 353 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
42. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
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subject of bargaining under the NLRA, the Court turned to the
question of "whether Ohio's antitrust law may be applied to prevent
the contracting parties from carrying out their agreement upon a
subject matter as to which federal law directs them to bargain. '" 43
Because of its relevancy to the question presented here, this aspect
of the Court's opinion is quoted in its entirety:
The goal of federal labor policy, as expressed in the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts, is the promotion of collective bargaining; to en-
courage the employer and the representative of the employees to
establish, through collective negotiation, their own charter for the
ordering of industrial relations, and thereby to minimize industrial
strife. . . Within the area in which collective bargaining was re-
quired, Congress was not concerned with the substantive terms
upon which the parties agreed. . . . The purposes of the Acts are
served by bringing the parties together and establishing condi-
tions under which they are to work out their agreement them-
selves. To allow the application of the Ohio antitrust law here
would wholly defeat the full realization of the congressional pur-
pose. The application would frustrate the parties' solution of a
problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good
faith toward solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no
limitations relevant here. Federal law here created the duty upon
the parties to bargain collectively; Congress has provided for a
system of federal law applicable to the agreement the parties made
in response to that duty, . . . and federal law sets some outside
limits (not contended to be exceeded here) on what their agree-
ment may provide . . . . We believe that there is no room in this
scheme for the application here of this state policy limiting the
solutions that the parties' agreement can provide to the problems
of wages and working conditions. Cf. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553, 566-567. Since the federal law operates here, in an area where
its authority is paramount, to leave the parties free, the inconsistent
application of state law is necessarily outside the power of the
State. . . . The solution worked out by the parties was not one of
a sort which Congress has indicated may be left to prohibition by the
several States. . . . Of course, the paramount force of the federal
law remains even though it is expressed in the details of a contract
federal law empowers the parties to make, rather than in terms in
an enactment of Congress .... Clearly it is immaterial that the con-
flict is between federal labor law and the application of what the
State characterizes as an antitrust law. ". . . Congress has sufficiently
expressed its purpose to ... exclude state prohibition, even though
that with which the federal law is concerned as a matter of labor
43. Id. at 295.
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relations be related by the State to the more inclusive area of re-
straint of trade." Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481.
We have not here a case of a collective bargaining agreement in con-
flict with a local health or safety regulation; the conflict here is
between the federally sanctioned agreement and state policy which
seeks specifically to adjust relationships in the world of commerce.
If there is to be this sort of limitation on the arrangements that
unions and employers may make with regard to these subjects,
pursuant to the collective bargaining provisions of the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts, it is for Congress, not the States, to provide it. 44
Although definitive on the major issue, the Oliver case leaves
several subsidiary questions unanswered.4 5 First, Oliver acknowledges
that "a local health or safety regulation" might prevail over a con-
flicting provision in a collective bargaining agreement but makes no
attempt to identify the types of state statutes which might come within
the ambit of the quoted phrase. In the private sector, the cases have
dealt with fairly traditional types of "health and safety" matters,'4 6
and this has not been a source of difficulty. A greater potential for
mischief exists in the public sector, however. Consider a state statute
which guarantees teachers a minimum number of sick leave days each
year.4 7 While this might, at first glance, seem to be a purely personal
benefit, it could be argued that the statute prevents teachers from
being forced to decide between losing pay by staying home or infecting
children by going to work, a legitimate "health or safety" concern.
As such, it should prevail over any agreement providing for fewer
days of sick leave, despite the willingness of the employee organiza-
tion to agree to the lesser number in return for an improvement in
some other area.
A similar argument might be made in connection with a teacher
certification statute. Although these statutes are designed primarily
to establish certain minimum professional standards for teachers,
44. Id. at 295-297 (footnote and some citations omitted).
45. There are several curious aspects to the Oliver case. Although it preceded San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), by only three months,
it was not discussed in the latter decision. Moreover, while the Court cited many of
the same cases in both Oliver and Garmon, a limited analysis of the preemption doctrine
was attempted in the former while a rather exhaustive consideration was undertaken
in the latter. Furthermore, while Oliver often has been cited on the issue of collective
bargaining for employees outside of the unit, it rarely has been cited on the preemption
issue.
46. Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 238, 246
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963); New York Central R.R. v. Lefkowitz, 259 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sup. Ct.
1965). But see Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78, es-
pecially 667 (1970).
47. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13468 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 231.40 (1973).
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they are in a broader sense intended to assure that those persons who
are placed in charge of children are adequately equipped to discharge
that responsibility, and thus, might well be characterized as involving
"health or safety." '48
Second, while the Oliver case clarifies the relationship between
the collective bargaining agreement and the conflicting state statute, it
does not indicate what the status of the state statute would be in the
absence of the agreement. Would it remain a valid statute with which
both the employer and the employees must comply unless and until a
contrary agreement was reached? Or would it be invalid even before
the execution of an inconsistent agreement because of the "chilling
effect" that its very existence might have upon the ability of the
parties to bargain in a totally unfettered environment?
We have found only one reported case-Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Commonwealth Department of Labor & Industry49- dealing with this
precise question. In that case, the union contended that the employers
were in violation of a Pennsylvania statute requiring railroad em-
ployees to be paid on a weekly basis. The employers conceded the
violation, but defended on the ground that the statute was at odds
with the RLA and, therefore, unenforceable. Since the state statute
was, by its terms, applicable only if the parties had not "otherwise
stipulated in the . . . applicable labor agreement," 50 it presented the
pure question of whether the very existence of a state statute establish-
ing a term or condition of employment constituted an improper in-
trusion upon the federal requirement of free and unfettered collective
bargaining. The court answered this question in the affirmative:
Although the Act of 1971 is expressly subject to the provisions of exist-
ing labor agreements . . . [i]t substitutes for customary conditions,
until an agreement is reached, the heavy and immediate hand of
state law for the collective bargaining process which Congress has
declared to be the best and only means of changing such condi-
tions. If we should hold that Pennsylvania may regulate customary
pay periods without the agreement of the parties required by The
Railway Labor Act, the state could similarly effect (and except
for our supersedeas would have here effected) changes in existing
practices so drastic as to render subsequent bargaining thereon
48. Although qualifications for new employees are recognized as a mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining under the NLRA, see, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, 143
N.L.R.B. 409 (1963), enf'd, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), some state interference is per-
mitted even in the private sector-e.g., licensing of insurance agents, certain hospital
employees, etc.
49. 314 A.2d 862 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1974).
50. PENN. STAT. tit. 43, § 255.1 (1973).
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pointless. Or, state regulations could be instituted during bargaining,
arbitration or mediation under The Federal Railway Act so favorable
to one of the parties as to render it impossible realistically for the
representatives of that party to relinquish the advantage so con-
ferred at the bargaining table although the other party is prepared
for a work stoppage unless a change is made. 51
The ramifications of the court's position are far reaching indeed.
In the context of the present discussion, the decision stands for the
proposition that all state statutes establishing terms and conditions
of employment would be invalidated by the mere passage of a federal
collective bargaining statute for public employees. It is important to
point out however, that this single opinion by an intermediate
Pennsylvania appellate court hardly can be cited as the prevailing view.
The absence of direct private sector precedent regarding the pre-
emption of state statutes establishing terms and conditions of employ-
ment should not be surprising: outside of the area of health and
safety, such statutes are essentially a phenomenon of the public sector.
Accordingly, it is necessary to turn to other contexts to obtain guidance
as to the significance, for preemption purposes, of a congressional de-
sire for free and unfettered collective bargaining. On several occasions
this matter has been the subject of judicial attention in connection
with state statutes which affect labor disputes, the precise question
being whether the state statute so intrudes into the dispute resolution
process as to improperly tip the employer-employee balance of power
established by Congress. Since the standard preemption test of San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon5 2 (i.e., conduct arguably
protected or prohibited by the NLRA) is not wholly adequate in
answering this question, several courts have attempted to assess the
state statute in terms of its potential interference with free and un-
51. 314 A.2d at 865-866.
This issue also was presented in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n,
28 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963), in which the plaintiff sought to invalidate a
regulation of the California Industrial Welfare Commission which prohibited employers
from requiring their employees to purchase uniforms. Included in the case were two
categories of employees: stewardesses and ticket agents. The stewardesses were covered
by a collective bargaining agreement which contained a provision which was con-
trary to the regulation, and consistent with the position taken in the Oliver case, the
court held that the agreement took precedence over the regulation. The ticket agents,
on the other hand, were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and thus
presented the same preemption question as was presented in the Commonwealth
Department of Labor & Industry case. The court found it unnecessary to reach this
question, however, since it invalidated the regulation on the ground that it had not
been enacted in accordance with the requirements of state law.
52. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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fettered collective bargaining. We recognize, of course, that the analogy
to cases involving state statutes establishing terms and conditions of
employment is by no means a perfect one: the parameters of free and
unfettered collective bargaining in the development of collective
bargaining agreements and the parameters in regard to the relative
balance of power which must be maintained to assure such freedom
once a dispute has begun are not necessarily the same. In both
areas, however, the courts have been called upon to judge the validity
of state-imposed restraints on what would otherwise be a laissez-faire
situation and, in this sense, a comparison may be instructive.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has been confronted with a
series of cases alleging improper state interference in labor disputes.
The first of these cases, General Electric Co. v. Callahan,5 3 was decid-
ed in 1961. It involved a Massachusetts statute which required the
State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration to investigate the causes
of certain labor disputes and to publish a factfinding report on the
blameworthiness of the parties. After noting the extensive "[c]on-
gressional occupation of the [labor relations] field,' ' 54 the court found
that the state's attempt to use the pressure of public opinion to induce
a settlement was "quite contrary to the national policy not to compel
agreement but instead only to encourage voluntary agreements free-
ly arrived at after 'good faith bargaining between the parties.' "55
In 1970, ITT Lamp Division of ITT Corp. v. Minter came before
the First Circuit Court of Appeals.5 6 In this case a struck employer
alleged that in providing welfare benefits to strikers, the State of
Massachusetts was altering the relative economic strength of the parties
in derogation of the national policy that guarantees free and un-
fettered collective bargaining. The district court had refused to issue
a preliminary injunction against payment of such benefits, and on
appeal the First Circuit was required to decide only whether the em-
ployer had demonstrated a probability of success on the merits.?5 The
court concluded that the requisite probability had not been shown,
citing the fact that the employer had failed to produce any empirical
53. 294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961).
54. Id. at 66.
55. Id. at 67. A virtually identical Oklahoma statute was invalidated by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co., 332 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1964). To the same effect, see Delaware Coach Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 265 F. Supp. 648 (D. Del. 1967) (holding invalid the state's revoca-
tion of a public utilities permit after a prolonged strike); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 208 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1965) (holding invalid the state's
suspension of premium payments during a strike of insurance agents).
56. 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
57. Id. at 991. But see Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor & Indus. Re-
lations, 378 F. Supp. 791 (D. Hawaii 1974).
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evidence demonstrating the impact which the availability of welfare
benefits to strikers had on the collective bargaining process. It was
not sufficient, said the court, merely to infer an infringement of the
federal policy. Furthermore, the court indicated that even if the
employer could demonstrate an impact on the collective bargaining
process, that would not be the end of the matter: since preemption
questions often require a "balancing of interests," it would then be
necessary to assess the countervailing impact on the state of the denial
of welfare benefits to strikers. Although the court's focus on "empirical
evidence" and "balancing of interests" marked a departure from other
preemption cases in the labor field, the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari.
Three years later, in Grinnel Corp. v. Hackett,58 another employer
raised essentially the same legal issue in connection with the payment
of unemployment benefits to strikers by the State of Rhode Island.
The district court, relying on dicta in the Minter case, held that the
proper forum for the resolution of the apparent conflict between the
state and federal statutes was Congress and, accordingly, denied the
request for a preliminary injunction.5 9 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed. While conceding that Congress was the preferable
forum, the court held that Congress was not the only forum and re-
manded the case to the lower court for a consideration of the issues in
light of the position that it had expressed in Minter. In specific terms,
it directed the lower court first to determine the actual relationship
between the payment of unemployment benefits to strikers and the
collective bargaining process. If that inquiry revealed that the state
statute did, to some extent, infringe upon the federal policy of free
and unfettered collective bargaining, the court indicated that it then
would be necessary to determine whether the unemployment scheme
"represented a compelling state interest 'so deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility that . ..we could not infer that Congress
had deprived the States of the power to act.' "60 Turning briefly to
the possible compelling state interests, the court suggested that the
payment of such benefits to strikers could minimize the occurrence
of violence during strikes and could avoid the economic stagnation
of communities.6 1 As in Minter, certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court.
58. 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973).
59. 344 F. Supp. 749 (D.R.I. 1972).
60. 475 F.2d at 459, quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1959).
61. Id. at 459-61. Although observing that unemployment compensation, like wel-
fare payments, is part of a federal-state system, the court did not limit its test for pre-
emption to such joint systems.
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In considering the applicability of the foregoing cases to the pre-
emption of state statutes establishing terms and conditions of public
employment, two caveats must be noted. First, not only are they private
sector cases, but they also arise in an analytically distinct, albeit related,
area. Second, the cases reflect essentially the thinking of a single court
of appeals. We must, therefore, speculate in two directions.
What would be the fate of the various state statutes establishing
terms and conditions of public employment if the tests laid down by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals were to be applied? Would a
teacher tenure statute, for example, be exempt from preemption?
"Health and safety" would seem to offer no haven. However, by pro-
viding teachers with a certain degree of job security, such statutes are
designed to assure professional freedom and thereby improve instruc-
tional quality, surely a matter which is "deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility. " 2 In any event, the First Circuit cases would re-
quire empirical proof that a tenure statute interferes with the relative
bargaining power of the parties and, if so, a showing that the degree
of interference is sufficient to outweigh the interests of the state in
maintaining a statutory tenure system. It is by no means clear that
this burden could be met.
Passing from the public sector/private sector dichotomy to the
second of the two caveats, what can be said in regard to the broader
application of the preemption tests developed in the First Circuit? Al-
though no firm indication exists at this time as to whether other courts
affirmatively will support these tests, 63 several observations would seem
appropriate. First, the current Supreme Court has, as a general matter,
tended to take a somewhat restricted view of the permissible outer
limits of federal action, at least in comparison to some of its more recent
predecessors. Although the expansive Garmon rule of preemption still
prevails, later decisions in tangential areas, 64 and vigorous dissents,6 5
may slowly be eroding what once was assumed to be black-letter law.
62. Cf. Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 70 L.R.R.M. 2042, 2044 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 180 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd, 202
N.W.2d 305 (Mich. 1972), in which the circuit court noted that the Michigan Teacher
Tenure Act "promotes good order and welfare of the state ... by preventing removal of
capable and experienced teachers at personal whims of changing office holders."
63. It is, of course, inappropriate to infer Supreme Court approval from the denial
of certiorari. The only substantive Supreme Court decision in this area, Super Tire
Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974), is limited to a holding that the question
raised regarding the payment of welfare benefits to strikers is justiciable even after
the strike has ended.
64. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (upholding federal
preemption of secondary boycott activities but indicating that the continued validity of
certain state statutes in the labor field is possible).
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The existing preemption doctrine also has been subject to in-
creasing attack by legal commentators. Professor Archibald Cox, for
example, in criticizing the continued judicial reliance on Garmon,
has suggested the following approach, which would, in effect, allow
courts to look into the purposes of the state and federal statutes in
each case:
It is obviously too loose to assert that federal law excludes any state
law that affects the balance of interests among management, union,
employees, and public in union organization and collective bar-
gaining. . . . Consequently, if the underlying rationale for federal
preemption is the need for preserving the balance which Congress
struck, some formula is required to measure the outer limits of
congressional concern.
Here again it seems possible to arrive at an answer by asking what
Congress was doing when it enacted the national labor laws. Congress
obviously had its own views concerning the special rights and
duties to be imposed upon employers, unions, and employees be-
cause of their relation to employee self-organization and free collec-
tive bargaining. Where further particularization would be appropri-
ate, it delegated the function to a specially constituted administra-
tive agency. But it is equally plain that Congress developed this
special framework for self-organization and collective bargaining
within a larger context of state law creating rights of property,
bodily security, and personality, preserving public order, and pro-
moting public health and welfare. These laws apply to the general
public or substantial segments thereof without regard to whether
the individual is an employer, union, or employee concerned with
unionization or a labor dispute. Neither the laws themselves nor any
particular application involves weighing the special interests of em-
ployers, unions, employees, or the public in employee self-organiza-
tion, collective bargaining, or labor disputes. The likelihood that
the collateral impact of such laws upon management or labor will
upset the national balance is small enough to permit their operation
unless interference with a specific federal right can be affirmatively
demonstrated. It is only where the state law or rule of decision is
based upon an accommodation of the special interests of employers,
unions, employees, or the public in employee self-organization,
collective bargaining, or labor disputes that the likelihood that its
application to persons under NLRB jurisdiction will upset the
balance struck by Congress is so great as to require exclusion of
state law unless Congress has provided otherwise.66
65. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971) (dissenting opinions by Burger, Douglas, White and Blackmun, JJ., urging a
departure from the Garmon rule in employee-union disputes).
66. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337, 1355-56 (1972)
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In sum, the private sector law of preemption is in a state of flux
and, despite the traditional judicial predilection for preemption, it
is really not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy what is
likely to happen to state statutes establishing terms and conditions
of public employment if Congress enacts a collective bargaining statute
for public employees without specifically addressing the preemption
question.
V. THE CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
It is against the foregoing backdrop that we now consider whether
Congress should indicate expressly its intent regarding the preemptive
effect of a federal collective bargaining statute for public employees,
and if so, what its options are in this regard. Our discussion is divided
into two parts. The first focuses upon state statutes establishing
systems of collective bargaining for public employees; the second
is concerned with state statutes establishing terms and conditions of
public employment.
A. State Collective Bargaining Statutes
The overriding purpose of a federal collective bargaining statute
would be to provide a uniform structure for regulating the relation-
ship between public employers and their employees. It is within this
context that we must assess both the need for an express statement
and the available options. It scarcely warrants extended discussion
to demonstrate that a uniform structure can best be assured if the
federal statute is the exclusive vehicle for public sector collective
bargaining and since, in the absence of a congressional statement to
the contrary, a federal collective bargaining statute clearly would
preempt state collective bargaining statutes, the case for congressional
silence is a persuasive one.
It does not follow, however, that this is the only way in which a
uniform structure for collective bargaining can be achieved. A uniform
structure can result even if state statutes are not preempted, provided
that those which remain in effect establish a structure which is sub-
stantially equivalent to that established by the federal statute. This
option is reflected in Section 12 of H.R. 8677, which sets out a system
(emphasis added). Although this excerpt is from an article analyzing the doctrine of
preemption as it relates to strikes and picketing, it would seem to apply in other con-
texts as well. Indeed, the First Circuit approved of the approach in Grinnell, stating
that it was consistent with the test of preemption which it applied in the case. 475
F.2d at 461 n.13. See also Note, Federal Preemption: Governmental Interests and the
Role of the Supreme Court, 1966 DUKE L.J. 484, 510, 511.
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under which a state may be exempted from the coverage of the federal
statute if its own statute meets a test of substantial equivalence."
Another option would be for Congress to provide for the exemp-
tion of state collective bargaining statutes on some basis other than
substantial equivalence or even to grant a blanket exemption to such
statutes. Since the rationale for a federal statute would be to establish
a uniform structure for collective bargaining in the public sector,
however, we may discard this option without further consideration.
B. State Statutes Establishing Terms and Conditions
of Public Employment
As far as state statutes establishing terms and conditions of employ-
ment are concerned, we believe that there are several reasons why
Congress should set forth expressly the balance that it seeks to strike
between federal and state policy. The sheer volume of state statutes
that potentially are subject to preemption marks this as a problem of
major proportions. One need not be omniscient to recognize that in
the absence of an explicit statement by Congress, considerable litiga-
tion would be necessary before workable guidelines emerged. More-
over, to the extent that the private sector provides a basis for projec-
tion, those guidelines would, for reasons indicated subsequently, ap-
pear to be less than optimum. Finally, the degree of concern which
this matter has generated would, in and of itself, argue strongly against
the "congressional incompletion" which characterizes the NLRA.
6
8
Assuming that Congress chooses to indicate expressly the pre-
emptive effect of a federal collective bargaining statute for public
employees, what are its options? Viewed on a continuum that begins
with a totally free and unfettered system of collective bargaining,
there are at least the following options:
67. The option here under discussion should be distinguished from that portion
of § 10(a) of the NLRA which provides that the National Labor Relations Board
is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to
such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, man-
ufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly
local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting
commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to
the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the cor-
responding provision of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent
therewith.
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). The above provision does not allow for a generalized exemp-
tion of the public employees in a state, but simply permits the NLRB, in its discretion,
to cede jurisdiction over selected cases on an ad hoc basis. In essence, then, it does not
really dilute the preemptive effect of the NLRA.
68. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240 (1959).
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1. State statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment
could be invalidated by the very enactment of the federal statute.69
2. State statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment
could remain valid unless and until the parties agreed to a contrary
arrangement through collective bargaining.
3. State statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment
could remain valid only as "minimum standards" regardless of their
phraseology, and the parties would be free to supplement them through
collective bargaining. A spin-off of this approach would be for the
state statutes to remain valid if they met certain specified criteria.70
4. State statutes establishing certain terms and conditions of em-
ployment (e.g., sick leave) could be invalidated while those establish-
ing other terms and conditions of employment (e.g., retirement) could
remain valid. The degree of validity or invalidity could be qualified
to reflect the positions taken in options 1, 2 or 3 above. A similar
approach could be taken with time as the critical variable (e.g., only
those state statutes which were in effect prior to the enactment of the
federal statute could remain valid).
5. State statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment
could remain valid notwithstanding the federal obligation to engage
in collective bargaining regarding the matters dealt with.71
69. In order to highlight the basic thrust of each of the options we shall state
them in somewhat oversimplified terms, ignoring various qualifications. Thus, for
example, even under this option, state statutes relating to health and safety pre-
sumably would survive.
70. See, for example, the criteria set forth in cases cited notes 53, 56, 58 supra.
71. It has been suggested that Congress cannot properly consider the options
available to it in regard to the preemptive effect of a federal collective bargaining
statute on state statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment unless it
knows (1) the precise number of states which have enacted statutes establishing each
of the various terms and conditions, and (2) the approaches which have been taken in
each of the counterpart statutes. See Lieberman, Memorandum Analysis of Preemption
Problems With Proposed Federal Bargaining Legislation for State/Local Employees,
Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 593, at E-2 to -3 (Feb. 17, 1975); Interim Resolution No. 1
of the Education Task Force, National Conference of State Legislatures, March 1975.
We fail to see how Congress could use this information in determining the position to
take in regard to preemption.
The aforementioned study by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
reports that 41 states have enacted teacher tenure statutes while only 19 have statutes
regulating sabbatical leaves for teachers. LAWYERS' COMMITrEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER
LAW, supra note 7, at 69. If the underlying rationale for the preemption of state
statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment is the need to preserve the
federal policy of free and unfettered collective bargaining, there might at first glance
seem more reason to preempt tenure statutes than sabbatical leave statutes since the
former tend to cast a wider net. Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes apparent
that the impact upon the federal policy cannot be judged in gross terms, but must
be assessed in the context of a specific collective bargaining relationship. And the
plain fact is that in every bargaining unit in each of the 19 states which have a statute
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PREEMPTION
It would serve little purpose to undertake a precise analysis of
the pros and cons of each of the options set forth in Part V above.
These options really do not lend themselves to this type of analysis,
since the choice ultimately must turn on individual perceptions of
the proper balance between federal and state interests. Our approach,
therefore, will be to try to identify the factors which are relevant in
striking this balance, and to use these factors as a framework for
formulating a position regarding the preemption question. The order
in which the following factors are set forth is not intended to reflect
their relative importance:
1. The position taken should be designed to cause as little dis-
ruption of the present system as may be necessary in order to achieve
the federal purpose. Phrased otherwise, Congress should not be un-
mindful of the fact that there now exist in many states rather exten-
sive-and presumably workable-structures for regulating both the
regulating sabbatical leaves, collective bargaining as to this matter would be restricted.
Perhaps the frequency of enactment should cut in the opposite direction. Thus, if the
educational policymakers in 41 states have seen fit to enact a teacher tenure statute,
might this not be sufficient to mark tenure as a matter that is so "deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility" that it should be exempt from the reach of the federal
statute? Regardless of which view is taken, it must be remembered that both the 41
and the 19 are transistory figures which simply reflect the number of state legislatures
which have chosen to deal with a particular term or condition of employment at a
particular point in time. Should the position taken as to preemption shift if and when
the number of state statutes in a given area reached some specified number?
Could the information be designed to indicate whether the statutory treatment
of a particular term or condition of employment is "more" or "less" comprehensive
in order to enable Congress to determine whether there still would be room available for
free and unfettered collective bargaining if the statute were allowed to remain valid?
Any attempt to make an across-the-board judgment in this regard would be fatuous
in light of the acknowledged diversity among the various states. Nor would it make
any sense to make such judgments on a state-by-state basis since this could produce
patently absurd results-e.g., Congress might preempt the tenure statute in the State
of New York because it tends to "occupy the field" while allowing the Kansas tenure
statute to remain valid because it is less comprehensive in nature. And, surely, no one
seriously would suggest that Congress should make a judgment as to the merits of
the specific approach taken by the various states and then resolve the preemption
question on the basis of this judgment.
It would seem unnecessary to belabor the point. The position which Congress takes
in regard to the preemption of state statutes establishing terms and conditions of public
employment must be formulated as a matter of policy, and the critical question is this:
to what extent, if at all, is Congress prepared to defer to the judgment of state legisla-
tures regarding the establishment of terms and conditions of public employment, despite
the fact that such deference will infringe to some degree upon the federal policy of free
and unfettered collective bargaining? Suffice it to say that the type of data which
the proposed study is designed to produce would be of little assistance to Congress
in answering this question.
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public employer-employee relationship and various substantive as-
pects of public employment.
2. Some problems which arise in regard to public employment
often are more suitable for resolution on a statewide basis than on a
local basis, and a state legislature is uniquely situated to fashion ap-
propriate statewide remedies for such problems.
3. In the public sector, disagreements over whether a state statute
is or is not preempted almost inevitably will involve a federal-state
conflict. The potential for such conflict should be minimized. This
can best be done if the federal statute takes a categorical position re-
garding preemption and does not require a federal court or adminis-
trative agency to judge state statutes against some subjective standard
(e.g., "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility"). Although
this concern would seem to loom largest in connection with state
statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment, it also
would have some relevance to the substantially equivalent test for
exempting state collective bargaining statutes in section 12 of H.R.
8677.
4. Congress is not in a position to judge adequately the relative
merit, importance, and/or impact of particular state statutes upon
free and unfettered collective bargaining, nor is it desirable for
Congress to do so as a matter of policy. Judgments of this type pre-
sumably would be necessary if Congress were to take a selective ap-
proach to preemption-that is, to preempt state statutes establishing
certain terms and conditions of public employment (e.g., sick leave)
but not those establishing others (e.g., retirement).
5. Permitting state statutes establishing terms and conditions of
employment to remain valid as "minimum standards," or for some
other limited purpose, could create certain difficulties in implementa-
tion. While it may be easy enough to apply a "minimum standards"
concept to a wage rate or the length of a workday, 72 it is quite another
matter to attempt to apply the concept to a retirement plan, a tenure
system, or other regulatory or procedural statute.
6. The time factor presents something of a dilemma. It must be
noted that the state statutes that are in effect at a particular moment re-
flect simply an interim judgment of the state legislature and appear
to have no common characteristic which is relevant for purposes of
preemption. In light of this, it makes little sense, for example, to
"grandfather in" those state statutes which were in effect prior to the
enactment of the federal statute, but to preempt those which became
effective thereafter. Moreover, a statute that used time as a determina-
72. Cf. note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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tive variable could generate difficult implementation problems. To
illustrate, how much could a "grandfathered" statute be amended
before it became "new" for purposes of preemption? And if a re-
strictive view were taken in this regard, might it not deter a state
legislature from making warranted modifications? Upon closer analysis,
however, the matter is not quite so clear-cut, and from a somewhat
different perspective the time factor does assume a certain relevance
to the preemption question. Whatever other factors may have prompted
a state legislature to enact existing statutes establishing terms and
conditions of employment, we know that a desire to avoid the effect
of a federal collective bargaining statute was not among them. To put
this another way, a state might choose to demonstrate its resistance to
federal intervention by enacting statutes which were so all-encompass-
ing as to eliminate any meaningful collective bargaining. Although we
believe that the political realities in the states are such as to render
this largely a hypothetical concern,'7 3 the position taken by Congress
should seek to foreclose the possibility.
7. The number of public employees is so large 4 that substantial
pressure would be placed upon any federal administrative structure
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over them. The existing private sector
structure already is clogged and, in order to avoid intensifying the
problem, there would have to be an expansion in resources sufficient
to accommodate the millions of additional public employees. Similar
problems may be anticipated even if a new administrative structure
is established for public employees, as through the separate statute
approach.
8. The position taken in regard to the preemption of state collec-
tive bargaining statutes should dovetail properly with the position
taken in regard to the preemption of state statutes establishing terms
and conditions of employment. Thus, if the federal collective bar-
gaining statute permits states to operate pursuant to their own col-
73. The type of statutes to which we refer would have to differ markedly from
those that traditionally have been enacted by state legislatures, and be couched in
rigid, all-encompassing terms-e.g., "teachers shall be entitled to a duty-free lunch
period of 45 minutes, no more and no less." Such statutes presume a type of political
impotence by employee interests which has not heretofore existed and which would,
if anything, seem even less likely after employees have been guaranteed organizational
and collective bargaining rights. Nor would the impetus for such statutes be likely
to come from public employers-quite the contrary. The opposition of public employers
to collective bargaining traditionally has been that it dilutes their management preroga-
tives. It hardly seems logical that, in order to avoid collective bargaining, they would
urge the state legislature to strip them totally of their decision making power.
74. In 1973, there were approximately 11.3 million state and local government em-
ployees. BUrEAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE U.S. 1974, at 265.
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lective bargaining statutes7 5 the exercise of this option should not
have substantive consequences vis-a-vis the preemption of state statutes
regulating terms and conditions of employment-that is, the pre-
emptive effect of the federal statute on statutes of the latter type
should be the same in those states which remain subject to the federal
statute as in those states which opt out.76
The foregoing factors do not necessarily all cut in the same di-
rection and certainly do not mandate the acceptance or rejection of
any particular option. They do suggest, however, that the strongly
preemptive approach that has characterized the private sector would
tend to have several negative consequences in the public sector, and,
corollarially, point up several advantages that would result from a con-
trary emphasis. In effect, then, these factors lead us to make the fol-
lowing recommendations.
A. State Collective Bargaining Statutes
We urge adoption of the approach taken in section 12 of H.R.
8677. In addition to the not insignificant political advantage of soften-
ing the opposition of many states' rights advocates, it could, by ena-
bling the states to utilize their own administrative structures, have the
practical advantage of reducing the burden placed upon the federal
machinery. Although this approach would create a situation in which
a federal agency would be required to judge state statutes against a
less than objective standard, ' the situation would by no means be
an open-ended one: the criteria for determining equivalency would
be found in the provisions of the federal collective bargaining statute
itself,78 and the universe for potential dispute would be extremely
limited (i.e., at maximum, the number of jurisdictions subject to the
federal statute). It also should be pointed out that the continued
use of state enforcement systems would reduce somewhat the inter-
jurisdictional precedent value of administrative and judicial rulings,
75. See H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1973).
76. This might at first glance seem to present a problem if Congress were to take
a strong preemption position in regard to state statutes establishing terms and condi-
tions of employment, since it would seem somewhat anomalous to provide in a federal
statute that one state statute (i.e., a collective bargaining statute) preempts other
state statutes (i.e., statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment). This
problem could be avoided, however, by making the position taken as to preemption
in the state's own collective bargaining statute a sine qua non for equivalency.
77. See factor number 3, p. 258 supra.
78. There is one factor which technically is not a criterion for equivalency but
which is of critical importance if the intent of this approach is to be realized-i.e., that
the state provide the funding that is necessary to implement adequately its own collec-
tive bargaining statute. We recommend, therefore, that explicit reference be made
to this factor in the federal collective bargaining statute.
BUGABOO OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
but this would not, in our opinion, significantly interfere with the
federal objective of establishing a meaningful, uniform system of
public sector collective bargaining.
B. State Statutes Establishing Terms and Conditions
of Public Employment
Our recommendation in regard to these statutes is divided into
two parts. The first deals with those statutes that were in effect prior
to the enactment of a federal collective bargaining statute for public
employees; the second deals with those statutes that become effective
thereafter.
We believe that Congress should permit those state statutes in the
first of the above two categories to remain valid notwithstanding the
fact that this would detract from a truly free and unfettered system of
collective bargaining. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, some
elaboration of this position may be helpful:
1. If the federal statute expressly addressed a term or condition of
employment, it would, of course, prevail over any conflicting state
statute.
2. Only state constitutional and statutory provisions would be
exempt from the reach of the federal statute. The exemption would
not extend to other types of state-level enactments (e.g., regulations,
administrative rulings), or to local charters, ordinances, etc.
3. The continued validity of a state statute would, in no sense,
"occupy the field" in regard to the subject matter in question. On
the contrary, the parties would be prohibited only from entering into
an agreement which was in direct conflict with the terms of the
statute and would be free through collective bargaining to supple-
ment it. Disputes as to the distinction between impermissible conflict
and permissible supplementation would be left to administrative and
judicial resolution on a case-by-case basis.
In order to set the stage for the second part of our recommenda-
tion, we note that the principal advantage of the foregoing position is
that it would not disrupt the structures that have been developed by
state legislatures over the years. Since this is not a consideration in
regard to future statutes, a somewhat different balance seems called
for. On the one hand, it would seem unwise for Congress to deprive
state legislatures of the power to amend existing statutes or to deal
with statewide public employment problems that might arise in the
future. On the other hand, we cannot ignore completely the afore-
mentioned possibility that a state might seek to undercut the federal
purpose by enacting statutes establishing terms and conditions of
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employment which were so all-encompassing as to render meaningful
collective bargaining impossible. We would recommend, therefore,
that state statutes establishing terms and conditions of employment
which become effective after the enactment of the federal statute (in-
cluding modifications of existing statutes) be valid only as "minimum
standards." By this we mean that, regardless of how such statutes were
phrased, they would constitute "floors" below which the parties could
not reach agreement, but would not otherwise restrict the parties' free-
dom to bargain collectively about the subjects in question.
Although there are certain implementation problems inherent in
any "minimum standards" approach, 79 these problems would not be
overly severe vis-a-vis future state statutes. In the first place, we would
be dealing with a relatively limited number of statutes (at least in
comparison to the extensive body of existing law) enacted over a con-
tinuing period of time. Moreover, state legislatures would be aware
of the "minimum standards" limitations and their awareness pre-
sumably would be reflected in the nature of their enactments, whereas
existing statutes were enacted without any consideration of this factor.
In conjunction with the positive case for the recommended posi-
tion, it is appropriate to consider potential objections to it, objec-
tions likely to come from both employee and employer spokesmen.
The former may contend that the failure to preempt state statutes es-
tablishing terms and conditions of employment will so restrict the
scope of collective bargaining that no meaningful collective bargaining
will be possible. In response, we would point out that the recommended
position represents basically a continuation of the system that exists
under virtually all. of the current state collective bargaining statutes,80
and few would deny that meaningful collective bargaining has taken
place in many states. Indeed, the press for federal intervention does
not derive from the fact that the scope of public sector bargaining is
unduly restricted by the existence of other state statutes, but from
the failure of the states to establish meaningful systems of collective
bargaining. It also should be noted that any purposeful attempt by a
state to upset the balance struck by Congress through subsequent enact-
ments would be thwarted by the "minimum standards" aspect of the
recommended position.
Employer representatives likewise may object to the recommended
position and, somewhat ironically, their primary objection promises
to be the other side of the coin of employee dissatisfaction. Thus, they
may contend that the position allows the employees "two bites of the
79. See factor number 5, p. 258 supra.
80. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).
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apple": if employees are unable to obtain a particular right or benefit
at the collective bargaining table, they will then be able to seek
it through legislative action. As previously noted, this is the system
that now exists under the state collective bargaining statutes and it
has hardly operated in a one-sided manner. The state legislatures have
amply demonstrated that they are not the tools of employee interests,
but that they will act only when, in light of all of the relevant cir-
cumstances, it is in the best public interest to do so."'
In the final analysis, the objections from both sides probably will
stem largely from the fact that the position we have recommended is
different from that which exists in the private sector. This, of course,
we concede, but view it as a subsidiary consequence of the self-evident
proposition that collective bargaining in the public sector is itself
different from collective bargaining in the private sector.8 2 It does
not, of course, follow from this proposition that the practices of the
private sector necessarily are inappropriate for the public sector. What
does follow, however, is that the problems of the public sector cannot
be resolved solely by analogy to the private sector, but must be con-
sidered on their own terms. The answers that emerge may, in some
areas, be quite different. We suggest that preemption is one such
area. 83
81. As Dr. Lieberman has quite correctly observed, the state statutes in question
"include some employer as well as some employee protections . . . [and] include a
great deal of legislation which appears to favor, or could favor, either employers or
employees, depending on the circumstances." Lieberman, Memorandum Analysis of
Preemption Problems with Proposed Federal Bargaining Legislation for State/Local
Employees, Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 593, at E-2 (Feb. 17, 1975).
82. As one commentator has put it, "government is not 'just another industry.'
H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 202 (1971).
83. See Appendix infra for proposed statutory language that would implement
the recommendations made in this section.
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APPENDIX:
PROPOSED STATUTORY LANGUAGE
A. This Act shall be the exclusive method for regulating the re-
lationship between employers and their employees in regard to all
matters covered herein: Provided, that if any state, territory, or posses-
sion of the United States shall by law establish a system for regulating
the relationship between employers and their employees which is sub-
stantially equivalent to the system established by this Act, and shall
provide adequate funding for the implementation of such system,
said state, territory, or possession, or any employee organization which
has been recognized as the representative of employees pursuant to
the system in said state, territory, or possession, may apply to the
Commission' for an exemption from the provisions of this Act. If the
Commission determines that the system of regulation established by
said state, territory, or possession is substantially equivalent to the
system established herein, it shall grant the requested exemption, to
take effect on a date fixed by the Commission. Any state, territory,
possession, or person aggrieved by the decision of the Commission
granting or denying the request for an exemption may obtain a re-
view of such decision in the same manner as provided under Section
1 1(f) of this Act.2
B. The duty to bargain collectively imposed by this Act shall ex-
tend to matters which are or may be the subject of a constitution,
statute, ordinance, regulation or other enactment by a state, territory,
or possession of the United States, or a political subdivision thereof,
and if legislative action is necessary to implement any agreement
reached, shall include the obligation of the employer to submit such
agreement to the appropriate governmental body for action: Pro-
vided, that, except as otherwise expressly provided herein, nothing
contained in this Act shall excuse noncompliance with:
1. Any express provision of a constitution or statute of any state,
territory, or possession of the United States, establishing terms and
conditions of employment, which was enacted prior to the date of
enactment of this Act; or
2. Any express provision of a constitution or statute of any state,
territory, or possession of the United States, establishing minimum
1. The word "Commission" is appropriate if a public employee collective bargain-
ing statute modeled after H.R. 8677 is enacted; the "National Labor Relations Board"
would be appropriate if public employees are brought under the coverage of the NLRA.
2. This language anticipates passage of a public employee collective bargaining
statute modeled after H.R. 8677; an appropriate counterpart reference would be re-
quired if public employees are brought under the coverage of the NLRA.
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standards for terms and conditions of employment, which was enacted
subsequent to the date of enactment of this Act.
C. All laws or parts of laws of the United States inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are modified or repealed as necessary
to remove such inconsistency, and, except as otherwise expressly
provided in Sections A and B above, this Act shall take precedence
over all constitutions, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations, or other
enactments of any state, territory, or possession of the United States
or any political subdivision thereof.
